

# COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XXIV. No. 4.] LONDON, SATURDAY, JULY 24, 1813. [Price 1s.

97] [98

## SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

**QUEEN OF SICILY.**—Amongst the incidents, in this grand drama, the war of Twenty Years already past, that, which the fate of the Queen of Sicily at this time presents, is not the least interesting.—The public has seen, from time to time, the proceedings which our Government has adopted in Sicily. They have seen, that the King of that country *retired* to make room for his son; they have seen that, under English auspices, a new sort of constitution has been formed; they have seen our news-papers filled with revilings against the Queen, and finally, they have seen that she is about to be sent out of the country.

—But, before we come to the case of Her Majesty, as depicted in her Letter to Lord William Bentinck, let us look a little at the *revolution*, which has been made in Sicily, under our auspices.—That a revolution in the government of Sicily has been made, there can be no doubt. That is a fact which is notorious. It is also a fact, that it has been made by us; that what has been done, in the way of change, has been done by our authority and power. In justification of this change, our writers allege, that the government of Sicily was very bad indeed; that it was excessively corrupt and oppressive; and, they have frequently added, that, in compassion towards the people, as well as for the sake of annoying the enemy, we ought to seize on the island for ourselves. This last measure is recommended by CAPTAIN PASLEY, whose book has been very much applauded in our public prints.—To talk of *peace*, while principles like these are afloat, is wholly absurd.—But, as to this *revolution* which we have made, it was necessary to the welfare of the people of Sicily, or it was not. If the latter, why did we make, and how are we to justify the act? If the former, with what reason is it, that the hireling writers and the tools of corruption in England cry out against *revolutionists*? With them, to be a revolutionist; to have views towards a revolution; to propose any material change in the government; to talk of a

reform of abuses and the cutting up of corruption by the roots; to appear in this character, in England, is, with these hirelings, to be a bad subject, an enemy of the country, and a friend of France; it is to be a Jacobin, a Leveller, a Disorganizer, and a fiend in human shape. Upon what ground can language like this, and sentiments like these, be justified in those who are the eulogists of the revolution which we have occasioned in Sicily? *There*, it seems, a revolution is a *good thing*; there, it seems to be justifiable to set aside a king and put up his son in his place; there, it seems, it is right to change the laws, and to abolish abuses and corruptions; but, to endeavour to effect only the reform of abuses in *England*, is, in the language of these vile hirelings, a crime nearly amounting to that of treason.—To look a little further into this matter; ought we not to be cautious how we set up such terrible outcries against the French for their revolutionizing acts, whether at home, or in foreign states?—We have made a revolution in Sicily, because we found the government so bad, that it ought to be changed. I do not find fault with our Ministers for this act. I know, that the government of Sicily was very bad, and, I think, that, having the power to change it, we did right in changing it. I approve of the act; for, it is the *happiness of the people*, which, in *all cases*, ought to be consulted.—But, while I maintain this, in defence of the acts of our own Government, I cannot join in condemning the revolutions which the French have made, either at home or in other countries.—If we are justified, as I contend we are, in having made a revolution in Sicily, because the government was bad, the people of France had, surely, a right to make a revolution in their own country, if they found their old government bad.—The only question, then, which we have to decide here, is, whether the old government of France was a *bad one*. And, who, in England, will attempt to answer that question in the affirmative? I will not now enter into a description of the various tyrannical acts of the old government of France; but,

will merely appeal to the evidence from our own lips. It is notorious, that, in England, the people of France, under their old government, were considered as the most wretched of slaves; that the speeches of our legislators; that our histories; that our plays; that our songs; that our proverbs and sayings; that all these represented the people of France as worthy of contempt, because they submitted to such a government; a government, which kept them in a state of slavery and starvation, while the nobles and the clergy were rich and fat. Hogarth's picture of *the gates of Calais*, and the song of *the Roast Beef of Old England*, contain the sum and substance of our former accusations against the old government of France, and against the people of that country for submitting to so wicked and tyrannical a government.—Here, then, especially with the present state of Sicily before us, we are reduced to this dilemma: either we were foul and base slanderers of the old government of France and of the people of that country; or, those who have quarrelled with the French for getting rid of that government, are most wicked and detestable men. Either all that we used to say of the old government of France was false and foul; or, we ought to have applauded the destruction of that government, instead of endeavouring to effect its restoration; instead of pouring forth the treasure and the blood of England in the cause of those who had this latter object in view. We ought to have received with open arms those men, who had set about the destruction of that, which we had, for ages, denominated a tyranny which no people ought to support, instead of loading them with every name calculated to excite hatred against them.—Hogarth, when he painted the "*Gates of Calais*," in which he represents a monk, sinking under his fat, tapping an English sur-loin with his finger, while the hungry, pale, and shirtless people are looking on at a distance; and, when, in another picture, he exhibited a monk feeling the edge of the *axe*, and seeing that the *rack* was in order to break human beings upon, while, in the back-ground, soldiers with their bayonets, under the command of the nobles, are forcing men on board the French ships of war; Hogarth, when he was thus employed, had little thought, that the time was not distant, when the people of France would rise against their government and destroy it; and, what would he have said to any one, who should have looked over his shoulder, and said: "stop, friend: take

"care what you do; for the day is at hand, "when England will make war upon those "who shall destroy this government, and "when the people of England will call "them *monsters*, while they *receive these* "very *Monks and Nobles with open arms*, "and even pay them stipends out of English "taxes?" What would Hogarth have said to a friend, who should have thus counselled him?—But (and now we come to the war-horse of the Anti-jacobins), it was not, say they, that the French made a revolution *at home* that we found fault with them. What we did not like; what alarmed us; and what finally led us into the war, was, that they began to carry their revolutionizing doctrine *into other countries*; and, that they even proclaimed by a *decree*, that they would *assist people of other countries in making revolutions*.—Now, this is a very material point; and, though at the end of a Twenty Years' war, worth our best attention.—The decree here spoken of, and so loudly complained of at the time by us, had these two important qualifications; to wit: 1st, that the people to be assisted should be living under a despotic government; and 2d, that, even then, the assistance should first be *asked for* by a decided *majority of the people*; and, it was, further, expressly declared to our Government, in the most solemn manner, that the Government of France, so far from having England in view, in that decree, wished most anxiously to form a friendly connexion with her Government.—However, be this as it may, I think our conduct in Sicily should make us look back to the outset of the war, and, at any rate, should make us very cautious in condemning the revolutionary acts of France in *other countries*. We will suppose, for argument's sake, that the French revolutionists did not mean to regulate their acts according to the qualifications in their decree; that they meant to upset, or change, every old government, *which they looked upon as bad*. And was this going beyond the principle upon which we have acted in Sicily? We have changed the government there; and for *what reason*? Because we found it to be a *bad* government; because we found it to abound in corruptions; to be oppressive on the people; to be, in short, a government which we thought too bad to suffer to remain as it was. Thus, then, I think, it will be perceived, that, at the end of a Twenty Years' war, begun to resist the principle of the French revolutionary decree, our present Ministers have not thought

it either  
princip  
it.—  
the gov  
govern  
ed wit  
jority  
we hav  
fication  
men; l  
was at  
volutio  
only in  
riously  
jority o  
The Fr  
have re  
land, S  
We sha  
volution  
verme  
and tha  
been ch  
said, in  
ments,  
govern  
since w  
the very  
Here, a  
how w  
have m  
entered  
entered  
tending  
friends,  
The Fr  
avowed  
king, ou  
dom of  
therefor  
but, wh  
or again  
judge.—  
been sai  
entered  
allies of  
possessio  
tions in  
cases, to  
selves,  
part of  
certainly  
allies of  
a revolu  
yet, seiz  
it to our  
however  
by Capt  
has been  
prints, w



it either unwise or unjust to act upon a principle not, at most, very different from it.—In justification of the changing of the government in Sicily, we say, that the government was oppressive; that it abounded with corruptions; and that a great majority of the people desired the change that we have made. A very satisfactory justification to the mind of all just and humane men; but, not a better justification than was at hand for the memorable French revolutionary decree; for, it offered assistance only in cases, where the people were notoriously oppressed, and where a decided majority of them demanded assistance.—The French, acting upon *their* principle, have revolutionized many countries. Holland, Switzerland, the States of Italy, &c. We shall be told, perhaps, that these revolutions were not justifiable; that the governments were *not bad*, like that of Sicily, and that, therefore, they ought not to have been changed.—But, whatever may be said, in this way, of other old governments, it will hardly be said, that the old government of *Naples* was a good one, since we have found that of Sicily, under the very same king and queen, so very bad. *Here*, at the least, we ought to be cautious how we load with reproaches those who have made a revolution.—We, indeed, entered Sicily as the *allies* of the king: we entered it with the avowed purpose of defending our *ally* and his rights; we, as *friends*, even paid that ally a subsidy. The French entered Naples in open, and avowed, and actual hostility against the king, our ally. They *conquered* the kingdom of Naples by arms.—The cases are, therefore, widely different in this respect; but, whether that difference is in our favour, or against us, I must leave the reader to judge.—The French, in some cases, have been said, and, I believe, truly, to have entered foreign states as the *friends* and *allies* of the sovereign, and, having got possession of them, to have made revolutions in the governments; and, in some cases, to have kept the countries for themselves, and actually to have made them part of the empire of France.—We certainly entered Sicily as the *friends* and *allies* of the sovereign, and we have made a revolution there; but, we have not, as yet, seized upon the country and attached it to our own dominions. This last step, however, has been strongly recommended by Captain Pasley, whose recommendation has been loudly applauded in the London prints, without bringing down on the heads

of the authors any public censure.—Now, the inference from all this is, that we ought to be very cautious how we inveigh with so much bitterness against those acts of the French which produce changes in the governments of other states, and how we give the odious name of *usurper* to every one who rules instead of the old rulers of such countries.—These events furnish, too, a most useful lesson to those, who were ready to rush into a war against *principles*; for, here we are, at the end of a Twenty Years' war against "*revolutionary principles*," actually engaged in making a revolution ourselves, in a foreign government, in the state of our *friend* and *ally*!—Let us now come to the particular case of the *Queen of Sicily*, as stated in her Letter to Lord William Bentinck, our Commander in Chief in the island. This Letter has appeared in all the London prints in the following words:

"LORD BENTINCK,—Notwithstanding  
 "the present extraordinary and irregular  
 "proceeding of your Court, to force me,  
 "the Queen of the Two Sicilies, by birth  
 "Archduchess of Austria, to abandon,  
 "after a union of 45 years, the King my  
 "spouse, and my family, to retire into my  
 "native country, under the specious but  
 "false pretexts—sometimes of my pretend-  
 "ed correspondence with the common  
 "enemy (an atrocious calumny! of which  
 "I defy any one to bring the slightest valid  
 "proof), and sometimes the violent pro-  
 "pensity I betrayed, as it is said, to create  
 "obstacles to the project of the English  
 "Government, to change the Constitution  
 "under which Sicily has existed so many  
 "ages; notwithstanding I am very far  
 "from acknowledging the authority of the  
 "British Government, of which God has  
 "rendered me quite independent by birth,  
 "I do not feel less the necessity of submit-  
 "ting to the order it prescribes; since this  
 "submission appears the only means of  
 "preserving the interest of my family, to  
 "which having devoted myself, during  
 "the whole of my toilsome career, I do not  
 "hesitate to make this last sacrifice, though  
 "it may, perhaps, cost me my life.—I  
 "declare, then, to you, my Lord, and  
 "through you to your Court, that, to this  
 "consideration only, and not to any other,  
 "I yield; and I am ready to set out to-  
 "wards the end of this present month, to  
 "return to the dominions of the Emperor  
 "of Austria, my august kinsman and ne-  
 "phew.—I must decline going to Sar-  
 "dinia, as I do not choose to be separated

“ from every branch of my family, and as,  
 “ at my time of life, the separation must  
 “ be expected to be final, I wish likewise  
 “ to avoid dying in a foreign land.—I  
 “ wish that, in making the arrangements  
 “ for my return to my native country, the  
 “ voyage may be rendered as short and as  
 “ little toilsome as possible: my age, and  
 “ my health, destroyed by twenty years of  
 “ pains, of chagrins, and of persecutions of  
 “ every kind, do not leave me even the  
 “ hope of terminating this journey.—In  
 “ submitting to *this act of violence*, as I  
 “ cannot, nor ought not to forget what is  
 “ due to my birth and rank, I demand, I  
 “ claim the previous execution of the fol-  
 “ lowing conditions, and I am persuaded,  
 “ my Lord, that you will both consent and  
 “ hasten the fulfilment of them.—1. That  
 “ an arrangement shall be made to secure  
 “ to my creditors the payment of their de-  
 “ mands, not being willing to quit Sicily  
 “ and fail in so sacred a duty. I demand,  
 “ also, that measures shall be taken for the  
 “ restitution of my diamonds, which are  
 “ deposited in the Bank of Palermo.—2d.  
 “ That there shall be delivered to me, as  
 “ soon as possible, a sum equal to the ex-  
 “ penses of a journey so long and so re-  
 “ mote, as I shall be compelled to under-  
 “ take, with a retinue befitting the rank in  
 “ which Providence has placed me.—3.  
 “ That there shall be secured to me a sum  
 “ sufficient to sustain this rank in the coun-  
 “ try to which I shall retire, and that it  
 “ shall be paid every six months in ad-  
 “ vance.—4. That permission to depart  
 “ shall be granted to every person whom I  
 “ may be willing to attach to my service,  
 “ and to that of my son Leopold, who ac-  
 “ companies his unfortunate mother; and  
 “ that those who receive pay from me, or  
 “ pensions from the Sicilian Government,  
 “ shall receive an assurance that they shall  
 “ be transmitted wherever I may reside.—  
 “ 5. Lastly, that there shall be placed at  
 “ my disposition, a frigate belonging to the  
 “ King, a corvette, and the necessary trans-  
 “ ports, on board which my retinue and my  
 “ equipage may be embarked: and I re-  
 “ quest to have the appointment of the  
 “ Captain of the frigate, for my particular  
 “ tranquillity, being in great dread of tra-  
 “ velling by sea.—I have reason to be-  
 “ lieve, my Lord, that you will find nothing  
 “ but what is reasonable and convenient in  
 “ my demands, the execution of which is  
 “ indispensable to a journey as long as it is  
 “ toilsome, and to which your Government  
 “ compels me. Your instructions, accord-

“ ing to my information from England, are  
 “ to make use of your influence over the  
 “ Sicilian Government, to dispose it to  
 “ make all necessary and convenient ar-  
 “ rangements which may be required. If  
 “ you have hitherto demonstrated extreme  
 “ perseverance and firmness in *obliging me*  
 “ to make a sacrifice of my existence, I have  
 “ reason to hope, my Lord, that without  
 “ you depart from the orders of your Court,  
 “ you will maintain the same character, in  
 “ order to ensure the last days of a Princess,  
 “ the victim of all kinds of misfortunes,  
 “ and to whom your Government, and the  
 “ English nation itself, will, one day or  
 “ other, tender the justice that she merits.  
 “ —I transmit you this letter by the  
 “ hands of Gen. Macfarlane, to whom I  
 “ owe infinite gratitude and thanks for the  
 “ delicate manner in which he has borne  
 “ himself towards me, and which makes  
 “ me desirous of continuing to receive  
 “ through him, any farther explanations of  
 “ this painful affair.—I beg you will  
 “ offer my compliments to Lady Bentinck,  
 “ whose feeling heart, I am persuaded,  
 “ participates and deplores my unmerited  
 “ sufferings.

“ April, 1813.”

From this letter we learn, then, that the  
 Queen of Sicily is to be banished from her  
 husband's dominions. She says, that this  
 act of force is about to be perpetrated partly  
 under *false pretexts*, and *atrocious calum-  
 nies*; but, we will, if you please, take it  
 for granted, that this is not true, and she  
 really has corresponded with, and favoured  
 the designs of, the “common enemy;”  
 that is to say, France. If this charge  
 against Her Majesty be true, which we  
 will suppose to be the case, how are we to  
 account for a line of conduct, apparently  
 so unnatural? She has always been esteem-  
 ed a clever woman, and, being such, she  
 could scarcely have failed to perceive *her  
 own interests*; and, it follows, of course,  
 that she must have thought, that she would  
 have been better off in the hands of the  
 French than in those of the English. The  
 woman was, doubtless, in error in so  
 thinking; but, this shows, at any rate,  
 that there are even persons belonging to  
 Royal Families that prefer the French to  
 the English; for, if any one deny this,  
 then he must say, that this charge against  
 her Sicilian Majesty is false and calum-  
 nious, and that, as far as relates to this  
 point, she will suffer innocently. But, we  
 are not to deny it. We take the charge to  
 be true; and, then, we have an instance,





quite complete, of a Queen preferring the French to us, and a Queen too, of the House of Austria.—This being the case, why are we to believe, that the Princes of the Rhenish Confederation, or any other of the Royal allies of France, *hate the French*? Why are we to believe, that their connexion with France is constrained, and that they sigh, day and night, for an opportunity to break off that connexion?—This charge against the Queen of Sicily should make us hesitate in adopting, with regard to other crowned-heads, an opinion disadvantageous to our enemy, who, be it observed, will not be the party to suffer from our error.—As to the *degree of punishment* inflicted on the Queen, it is certainly less severe than that inflicted on the late Queen of France; but, I believe, that *banishment* stands next on the list after that of *Death*.—What was the crime, then, or, rather, what were the crimes, imputed to the Queen of France? They were very numerous, but, amongst them were found those of *corresponding with the open enemies of France, and endeavouring to aid their views*.—The Queen of Sicily says, that part of the accusation against her, is, that she created obstacles to the project of the British government to change the constitution under which Sicily had existed so many ages.—It is certain that the Queen of France created every obstacle in her power to the change made in the constitution of France.—The charges against these two Queens seem, thus far, to be similar; and, therefore, we shall have the merit of having been more lenient, than the French revolutionists were. They inflicted death: we stop at banishment; but, still there is punishment of a Queen in both cases; the difference is merely in the degree.—Besides, in the case of the Queen of France, there was a trial of some sort, at least, before punishment; and, we are, as to the degree, to consider what is, at the age of the Queen of Sicily, the difference between death, and banishment from her family and a throne.—Mind, I do not say, nor do I pretend to think, that, under certain circumstances, it may not be just and necessary to banish a Queen; nor do I doubt at all, that the Queen of Sicily deserves to be banished from Sicily and from her family for life; but, I must take leave to observe, that, if we admit the thing to be right in this case, we ought to have taken time to consider, before we made the death of the Queen of France a ground for treating the French revolutionists as savages and

cannibals. We, doubtless, were, in so doing, misled by our humanity, and by our attachment to Royal personages, and could not possibly foresee, or imagine, that the time would arrive, even before the termination of the war, when *justice and necessity* would call upon us to inflict upon the sacred person of a Queen a punishment next in degree to that of death.—If, when Mr. Burke was ranting and raving and roaring and foaming about MARIE ANTOINETTE, and blubbing over the departure of that age, when a thousand swords would have flown from their scabbards to avenge an insult offered by the people of France to that Queen; if, during that raging fit, some one had come and tucked him by the sleeve, and said: “softly, softly, Edmund! Not so boisterous in pursuit of your pension; for, my good fellow, before this very war, which you are now kindling up, is ended, this government of England will cause to be banished from her country and her family, a Queen; aye, and the sister too, of this very Queen of France.” If honest Edmund had been thus accosted, what would he have said; and especially if he had been told in addition, that the person employed by the government to put the banishment in force, would be a son of the Duke of Portland, who, at that time was coming over to his old political enemies in order to aid them in a war against the revolutionists of France?—There is one circumstance which constitutes a great difference between the cases of the Queens of France and Sicily; namely, that the former was accused with holding a correspondence with foreign powers, and inviting them to attack France, and with causing a famine, and kindling a civil war in the Realm. While the latter is accused of holding correspondence with the common enemy; that is to say, the enemy of Sicily and of England also. I shall suppose, that the people of Sicily concur with our government in the justice and necessity of thus punishing their Queen; but, it ought always to be borne in mind, that the Queen of France was punished for crimes (real or invented) against France alone; and not for crimes against France partly, and partly against a Foreign power.—If we admit that it be right for our government, with the concurrence of the people of Sicily, to banish the Queen of Sicily, and that, too, without the form of a trial, it is not easy, I imagine, to shew, that the people of France had not a right to punish their Queen upon a similar charge,

supposing her to be guilty of that charge. Yet the writers in England failed not to call *murderers* those who put to death the Queen of France. We should, therefore, be very cautious how we give way to the use of such language, even towards our bitterest enemies.—It will be said by John Bowles, and the Times, and the Courier, that the Queen of France was perfectly innocent of the crimes laid to her charge, and that the Queen of Sicily is guilty of all those which are laid to her charge now. If we were to put John upon his *proof* of either of these assertions, he would be very much puzzled to produce it. I, for my part, know nothing of the guilt or of the innocence of either of these Queens, and I know that it is impossible, or next to impossible, that any contemporary writer should be better informed upon the subject than myself. The truth is, that we know nothing of the matter, as far as relates to the guilt or innocence of either of these personages. All that we know is, that one of them was punished with death, and that the other, if the above letter be authentic, has been, or is to be, banished. If we acknowledge, as I do, the right of our government, in concurrence with the people of Sicily, to punish the Queen of Sicily for crimes against the country; how can I deny that the government of France, with the concurrence of the people of France, had a right to punish the Queen of France for crimes against that country?—The conclusion I aim at in these observations is this, that the transactions in Sicily, if truly represented in our public prints, clearly shew, that we ought to be very cautious how we give way to invectives against any people that may find it necessary to inflict punishment on the members of their Royal Family. The wisdom, the rectitude, the moderation, the benignity, the purity, so notorious in our own Royal Family, ought not to mislead our judgment in other cases. Judging from them, we were too ready, perhaps, to condemn as savages and murderers the people of France, not thinking it possible, from the specimen before us, that any Royal personage could merit punishment of any sort, much less the punishment of death; but, since we have now found out, that there is one Queen in Europe, the consort of our ally, and the sister, too, of the late Queen of France, who does really deserve banishment, the next punishment in degree to that of death, I think we ought to be more charitable in judging of the conduct

of our neighbours, and not treat them as savages and murderers, especially, as all the world will agree that that is not the way to reclaim them, to assuage their animosity towards us, or to hasten the period of a sincere and lasting peace, which alone can lighten our burdens and revivify our perishing commerce.—To the language of the Times news-paper, and to that of other daily, weekly, and monthly publications, we owe, in a great measure, the continuance of this expensive, this bloody, this demoralizing war: Like Satan they seem to be bent upon the destruction of the human race; and really it would appear that they mourned upon every occasion affording a glimpse of hope of returning peace. But I trust that the nation will, at last, come to its senses, and will perceive that a much longer continuance of the war, if it can be prevented by fair and safe terms of peace, is to be justified upon no principle hitherto received as good and sound amongst men.—As to the fate of the Queen of Sicily, it is a matter of perfect indifference to me. I only hope that, in the hours of her banishment, she will look back to the time when she and Lady Hamilton and Lord Nelson were in the Bay of Naples in the year 1799. If I wish her any thing in addition to this, it is, that she may have with her a copy of the elegant and eloquent letters of MISS WILLIAMS; and that, in a character visible to the dimmest eyes, the name of ELEONORA FONSECA may be kept constantly in her view every day to the last of her life.—I cannot refrain, before I conclude this article, from referring the reader to a pamphlet published by Mr. Hatchard in Piccadilly, entitled CAPT. FOOTE'S VINDICATION. I also beg leave to refer him to MR. BELSHAM'S HISTORY OF GEORGE THE THIRD. In those works he will see the bloody account of the Bay of Naples. And when he has read Captain Foote's pamphlet through, I am sure he will agree with me in feeling great joy, that so humane, so honourable, and so incorruptible a man should now be the Port Admiral at Portsmouth; and will not think it a small merit on the part of the Lords of the Admiralty, that they should have chosen such a man for such a post.—I never saw Mr. Foote but once, and then, I must say, that I did not much like him. This only shews that I was out in my judgment; for the contents of his pamphlet, which I have since read, and a great part of which consists of authentic



documents, *proves* him to have been, that which we always wish to see in men of his profession, and which we so seldom meet with in men of any profession, namely, a man in whose lips *truth* was not to be suppressed by the dread of poverty or the hope of riches and honours.

WM. COBBETT.

*Botley, 21st July, 1813.*

## OFFICIAL PAPERS.

### FRENCH PAPERS.

#### ARMY OF ARRAGON.

*Extract of a Letter from Marshal the Duke of Albufera, to the Minister at War.*

*(Continued from page 96.)*

*"Tortosa, June 21, 6 a. m.*

"Monseigneur le Duke,—I informed your Excellency of the embarkation of the Anglo-Sicilian army at Alicant, of its departure from that place on the 31st May, and of its rapid arrival on the 2d June under Tarragona. The army landed during the night, hastened to invest Fort St. Philippe at the Coll de Balaguer, and the enclosure without a fosse, which at present constitutes the defence of Tarragona, the forts and extensive fortifications having been razed. A fire from several batteries began on the 3d, during five days Balaguer held out, made an honourable resistance, and killed or wounded of the enemy more than 300 men.—On the morning of the 7th, the explosion of a powder magazine caused the surrender of Fort St. Philippe. The enemy, by a fire kept up from the sea and land, attacked Tarragona. At the departure of the Anglo-Sicilian Army, the Duke del Parque had arrived from Caroline to replace General Murray in his camp at Castella. Elio, with the 2d Spanish corps, was close upon our posts.—As soon as I was informed that the enemy had sailed from Alicant, I made dispositions upon the coast of Valencia to receive prompt information, whilst I charged General Decaen to collect troops to fall upon the English. He eagerly executed that disposition, and on the first information detached from Gironne Beurmann's brigade upon Barcelona, where he arrived the 10th of June. On the 2d of June I had dispatched from before the Xucar Mus-  
nen's division, and the brigades of Panni-

tur and Agremont; they proceeded by forced marches towards Tortosa. I learned at ten leagues from Valencia that the fort of Balaguer had capitulated; I lost the only cannon road by which I could act, but it was of importance to stop the enemy's success, and on the 10th, I proceeded to Tortosa. The head of my column overthrew the English dragoons near Perells; on the 11th my troops arrived; I pushed forward on the 12th upon the Tarragona road; and not being able to act on the high road, I determined to seek a bye-road across impracticable mountains in order to announce my arrival to the brave garrison of Tarragona, which refused all summonses, and defended itself with high valour. In short, on the 12th I lighted fires on the tops of the mountains, and advancing on the 13th beyond the village of Valledellos, my troops could see and be seen from Tarragona.—In the mean time General Maurice Mathieu set out from Barcelona, and pushed forward to Arbos. The resistance of the place, and the march of columns from Barcelona and Valencia frightened the enemy, and obliged him to precipitately raise the siege and re-embark the greater part of his troops, abandoning under the place 27 pieces of artillery and an immense number of bombs, bullets, &c. all of which have been conveyed into Tarragona. The convoy of 180 sail left the port of Sallau, and came to anchor under Balaguer; this mass of vessels presented a fine spectacle.—On the 14th, I advanced my troops to reconnoitre the fort; some battalions defended the approaches to it, and the fleet fired a more hot than murderous fire upon us. Upon Valledellos the English dragoons were roughly handled by the Westphalian light horse, and the 5th light infantry obliged five English battalions to fall back under Hospitalet and the fire of the English ships.—On the 15th and 16th there were slight skirmishes, and the report of 25 deserters proved to me that the enemy, either covered by the fort of Balaguer, or embarked, were placed out of reach of any attempt on the part of a land army.—Whilst I was acting in Catalonia, I had left General Harispe with the 2d and 3d division before the Xucar; on leaving him I directed he should draw in his advanced posts and establish himself in works prepared for some time behind the river. The movement was being executed with precision, when on the 11th, General Elio, with a numerous cavalry, attempted to press upon our rear-guard. General Miselop,

who commanded, turned, and at the head of a squadron of the 4th hussars, vigorously charged the enemy, killed or wounded 50 men, and brought back 60 horses and as many prisoners. The Irish Colonel, Oroman, was of the number. On the 13th, in the morning, a double attack was made on the points of Alberique and Alara, early in the morning. General Harispe sustained in a great part of the day the enemy's demonstrations; a brisk cannonade took place, but the enemy refused to engage. The Duke del Parque, with the divisions of the Prince D'Anglona and of the English Roche, attacked in two columns General Herbert, before Careaxente, who did not hesitate to march against the enemy at the head of a squadron of the 4th regiment of hussars, and the whole of the 14th and 16th of the line; he reached and broke the enemy in the streets and gardens of Careaxente, more than 400 Spaniards were killed or wounded, 700 soldiers and 30 officers made prisoners, the colours of the Carmona regiment taken, and the enemy put completely to rout. From that time up to the 18th, the enemy had undertaken nothing serious against the troops of Valencia.—The expeditionary fleet continues at anchor off Balaguer, keeping some battalions near Hospitalet, and under the fort. My troops being acting in deserts, I decided upon bringing them towards Ampolla, upon the Tarragona road, to procure them water, of which we had been deprived for two days. I have been informed that Gen. M. Mathieu, informed of the raising of the siege of Tarragona, had advanced to that town and to Reus. I, however, persisted in prolonging my stay in Catalonia, in order to unravel the enemy's projects, when yesterday I learned that the English had resolved to blow up the fort of Balaguer; this resolution, which entirely entered into my projects, proves to me that the enemy will not renew his attack upon Tarragona, nor seriously act in Catalonia, which sufficiently informs me of what remains to be done.—Thus, M. le Duc, the first operations of the English upon a line of 80 leagues, has been confined to the taking of a fort and a garrison of 83 soldiers, commanded by a Lieutenant, whilst they have lost in killed, wounded, prisoners, or deserters upon the Xucar, or at Tarragona, above 1,600 men and a flag; whilst they have raised the siege, and abandoned 27 pieces of cannon before a dismantled place without fosses, but defended by a small but very valiant garrison."

*From the Same to the Same.*

*Valencia, June 25.*

M. Le Duc,—By my report of the 21st I informed your Excellency of the precipitate raising the siege of Tarragona by the English, and their re-embarkation; the necessity of following the movements of the fleet has forced me to sacrifice the pleasure I should have had in congratulating the Governor Bartolette, and his brave garrison, upon his fine and vigorous defence. By going to Tarragona I should have lost six days, whilst, as soon as I received a report from General Mathieu, from Reus, and two letters from General Bartolette, I only thought of returning to Valencia to prevent the English from anticipating me.—The loss of the English at Tarragona has been immense; thirty pieces of heavy caliber, mortars, fire-ships, bombs, magazine of rum, salt meat, &c. have been delivered to the flames; but the enemy suffered still more considerable losses on the night between the 20th and 21st; signals, firing of cannon, announced that the immense convoy had decided to quit the coast of Catalonia. At day-break ten large vessels were seen off the mouth of the Ebro; eighteen brigs or large ships had grounded upon the sands at the mouth of the river. Your Excellency will be able to judge of it by the Reports of the Chef des Gardes de la Sante, which I have the honour to enclose.—As soon as I was informed of it, I ordered assistance to be given to those vessels; but the great difficulty in arriving prevented their reaching them. Several ships detached from the grand convoy have returned; they succeeded in saving the greater part of the troops and transports; it appears the enemy lost but five ships, which in general were abandoned.—As soon as I was informed the enemy had sailed for the coast of Valencia, I put Musneer's division and Agremont's brigade in march. By an effort worthy of praise, they marched fifteen leagues a-day, ambitious of anticipating the enemy's fleet at every point. All the declarations of the Captains whose vessels grounded, state, that the enemy was to have disembarked at Castellon de la Plana, to have separated me from the forces which I had left upon the Xucar; the astonishing rapidity of the march of our troops, and the violence of the winds, have not allowed the enemy to execute his projects; he remained three hours in sight of Castellon on the 22d, and on the same day I arrived there with 4,000 men, 800 horse, and six pieces of light



artillery. The fleet, beaten by contrary winds, appeared before the *Gras de Valence*, a frigate was detached to take possession of the small privateer, the *Determinée*: she was close in shore, and grounded before *Murviedro*. Gen. Bonille proceeded with two companies of grenadiers and two pieces of cannon to her assistance; a lively musketry fire took place, the enemy launched several boats filled with troops, they attempted to repulse our people, but were so well received, that they retired with considerable loss.—[The remainder of the dispatch states that the efforts of the English to again kindle the war in Catalonia have failed.]—I am, &c. (Signed) The Duke of ALBUFERA.

#### IMPERIAL DECREE.

*Head-quarters, at Dresden, June 18, 1813.*

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of the Confederation of Switzerland, &c.—We have decreed, and do decree as follows:—

#### Title I.—*Formation of a List of Absentees.*

Art. I. There shall be formed a List of Absentees in the 32d Military Division.

Art. II. This List shall comprehend—

1. All the individuals, who, exercising public functions, shall have absented themselves from the country, at the moment of the re-entry of the French army.—2. The Senators of Hamburg and Lubeck who shall have resumed their functions after the evacuation of the French army.—

3. All proprietors who shall have absented themselves since the 1st of March, and shall not have returned within 15 days after the publication of the present decree.—4.

All the individuals who may have accepted the rank of Officer in the levies for the enemy;—all the individuals who served in the Hanseatic Legion, or took part in the magistracies created by the enemy.—5.

All the individuals known to have formed part of the armed assemblages, and to have excited the people to revolt.—6. All the individuals known to be in the service of England, whether civil or military;—all those known to be in the service of Russia, and of Prussia, whether civil or military.—

7. In fine, all the individuals who shall have left their homes since the 1st of March of this year, and who shall not have returned within 15 days after the publication of the present Decree.—

Art. III. The list of all such individuals shall be formed without delay, under the orders of the Prince of Eckmuhl, by de-

partment, district, canton, and municipality. For this purpose, a Commission shall be appointed by the Prefects in every district and town. The lists shall be renewed every fortnight, and shall be transmitted to the Minister of General Police, and to the Director-General of Domains and Registration.

#### Title II.—*Of the Effects of Absence.*

Art. IV. Sequestration shall be immediately placed on the property, moveable and real, of all the individuals entered on the list of absentees in the 32d military division. Our Board of Domains and Registration shall immediately take possession of the same, and a statement of the value of all the property thus seized shall be transmitted to the Director-General.

Art. V. While any individual is on the List of Absentees, he can no longer perform any civil act. The debts which are due to them, the property which they shall inherit, shall be sequestered and collected to the benefit of our domain. The produce of the said property shall be paid in to the registration chest.

Art. VI. Individuals having been once entered on the list of absentees, and their property in possession of the Board of Domains, the erasure of their names from the said list, and the removal of the sequestration from their property, can no longer take place but in consequence of a decree from us.

Art. VII. Our Ministers of Finance, of Treasure, of War, and of Police are charged with the execution of this Decree, which shall be inserted in the Bulletin of the Laws, and communicated to the Major-General, to the Director of the Administration of the Army, and to the Prince of Eckmuhl.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

By the Emperor,  
The Minister Secretary of State, Count DARU.

#### SPANISH WAR.

LONDON GAZETTE, July 13.

*Admiralty Office, July 13.*—Copy of a Letter from Captain Adam, of His Majesty's ship the *Invincible*, transmitted by Rear-Admiral Hallowell to J. W. Croker, Esq.

*His Majesty's ship Invincible, off the Coll de Balaguer, June 8, 1813.*

Sir,—In pursuance of your directions to take the ships and vessels, named in the margin, [Thames, Volcano, Strombolo, Brune, and eight gun-boats], under my

orders, and co-operate with Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost in the siege of the fort of the Coll de Balaguer, I have the honour to inform you, that the troops were landed about noon of the 3d instant, and the Lieutenant-Colonel immediately invested the fort, the riflemen of De Roll's regiment, and other light troops, being pushed close up to the walls.—The fort is situated in a most difficult pass, through which the high road from Tortosa to Tarragona winds, and it is absolutely the key of the only road for cannon into this province from the westward, without going round by Lerida. It is armed with 12 pieces of ordnance, including two ten-inch mortars, and two howitzers; and the surrounding heights are so difficult of access, that it has been a work of the greatest labour to establish the necessary batteries before it.—Two six-pounder field-pieces and a howitzer were landed on the evening of the 3d instant, dragged up, and placed on the ridge of a steep and rugged mountain, to the S. E. of the fort; two 12-pounders were added to the former by noon of the next day. The whole remained under the command of Lieutenant Corbyn, First of the Invincible, having under his orders a detachment of midshipmen and seamen from this ship, and a most excellent fire was kept up from them, which considerably damaged the defences of the fort, and checked its fire upon our working parties.—In the meantime three Spanish 24-pounders were landed, and two more guns, of the same caliber, from this ship, to be got up by the high road to the foot of a very steep height, on the crest of which the breaching-battery was to be constructed, at about 300 yards from the eastern face of the fort.—In the afternoon of the 4th instant the fort was summoned to surrender, and the Commandant answered, that he should defend the place committed to his charge.—During the night of the 4th, every exertion was used to bring the guns up the hill, and to complete the breaching-battery; but, as it could not be completed by day-light, the men were withdrawn.—The seamen and marines were landed early in the afternoon of the 5th, and carried up the stores for the battery, under a brisk fire of shot and shells from the fort.—The three Spanish 24-pounders, notwithstanding their immense size and weight, were conveyed up the side of the hill, over the most difficult and rugged ground, by the united exertions of the soldiers, seamen, and marines, under the immediate direction of Captain Carroll,

of the Volcano. The two eight-inch mortars were brought as far along the road as was practicable before dark, and the iron 24-pounders were conveyed to the foot of the hill as soon as it was dark.—The work of the battery advanced rapidly, although it was necessary to fill all the sand-bags at the bottom of the hill, and I was in confident expectation that the battery would open soon after day-light; but by ten o'clock the rain fell in torrents, attended by the most violent thunder and lightning I almost ever witnessed.—The quantity of ammunition which had been brought up for the battery laying in exposed situations, made it the more awful, and the enemy kept up an incessant fire of shells and grape-shot.—In defiance of all these obstacles two of the guns were got high enough up to mount on the platforms, but all our exertion was unequal to place them there, owing to the violence of the rain, and the excessive difficulty of working in the extreme darkness of the night. From the same reason, too, the mortars could not be brought forward, and after a night of the most excessive labour, we had the mortification of being again obliged to retire, the officers and men being quite worn out.—The weather continued very bad until the afternoon of the 6th instant, when a party was landed, and the mortars were got forward; before day-light the seamen and marines were on the pile, and all the guns were placed on the battery ready for mounting. The two mortars opened soon after day-light, and the shells were thrown with great precision, by Lieutenant James, of the Royal Marine Artillery, landed from the Strombolo, who worked the mortars with his party; and the fire from Lieut. Corbyn's battery was resumed with excellent effect. This united force made very considerable impression on the fort; an expense-magazine was blown up, and the enemy's fire was very much slackened.—At seven o'clock, just before the breaching battery was ready to open, a white flag was shewn from the fort; Capt. Stoddart, of the Strombolo, and Capt. Zelmpfenning, were immediately sent to the fort, and the latter returned in a few minutes with an offer from the Commandant, to surrender the fort and garrison upon conditions of marching out with the honours of war; the officers and men preserving their private property.—This was immediately acceded to by Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost and myself: the fort was taken possession of by the advance of the troops. The garr-



son marched out, grounded their arms on the glacis, and were immediately embarked.—I have great satisfaction in stating, that during this service, which has so much depended upon the united exertions of the army and navy, the most perfect cordiality has existed among all ranks; and I have met, in Lieutenant Colonel Prevost, all that openness of communication and confidence which an acquaintance with the character of this excellent officer gave me reason to expect.

In an operation where the laborious exertions of the Captains, Officers, seamen, and marines, under my orders, have been most conspicuous, I hope I shall be excused for having gone so much into detail; but it is my duty, and a most agreeable one to bring under your view the praiseworthy conduct of all ranks and descriptions. I must particularly draw your attention to the zeal and activity displayed by that valuable Officer, Captain Carroll, of the Volcano; his conduct was the admiration of every body, and he was ably supported by Lieutenant Pidgely, of the Invincible, and the other officers, seamen, and marines under his direction. From the explosion of a shell near him, the night before, Captain Carroll was obliged to suspend his services until the morning of the 7th (but I am happy to state he has perfectly recovered); and Captain Stoddart, of the Strombolo, succeeded him in the direction of getting up the guns, &c. for the breaching battery, and deserves every credit for his active services. I am also much obliged to Capt. Badcock, of the Brune, for the assistance he afforded me.—I cannot conclude this letter, without calling to your notice the indefatigable exertions of Lieutenant Corbyn, both in getting the guns up to the battery he commanded, and the excellent fire he kept from them afterwards; and I feel highly gratified in noticing the conduct of so old and excellent an Officer, with whose value I am well acquainted from a service of many years together.—I have the honour to enclose a list of the killed and wounded of the crews of the ships under my orders, which, considering the fire upon us for so many hours, is unaccountably small.—The troops under Colonel Prevost's command have had an Officer and four men killed, and 39 wounded, in which are included an Officer and seven soldiers of the Spanish regiment of Palma.—I have enclosed you a list of the garrison of the fort, consisting of two lieutenants, a surgeon,

and garde-magazin, 16 Italian artillerymen, and 83 non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the 11th French regiment of the line, of whom 2 were killed and 11 wounded.—I likewise enclose returns of the ordnance, &c. found in the fort.—During the siege of the fort, the gun-boats were stationed in Ampolla Bay, to observe the road from Tortosa, as we had constant reports of the enemy being in motion from that quarter.—I have the honour to be, &c.

CHARLES ADAM, Captain.

*A Return of Killed and Wounded, belonging to His Majesty's Ships and Vessels under the Orders of Capt. Adam, of His Majesty's Ship Invincible, at the Attack on Fort St. Philippe, in the Coll de Balaguer, between the 3d and 7th June, 1813.*

KILLED.—Volcano. J. Gasson, gunner of royal marine artillery.

WOUNDED.—Volcano. J. Hunter and J. Fairhead, ordinary seamen, severely.

Invincible. T. Bouchier, private of royal marines, severely; W. Somerville, landman, severely.

Thames. W. Hunt and W. Price, privates of royal marines, severely.

Strombolo. None killed or wounded.

Brune. None killed or wounded.

(Signed) CHARLES ADAM, Captain.

*Return of the French Prisoners taken at Fort St. Philippe, June 7.*

*Camp, near Fort St. Philippe, June 3, 1813.*

11th French Regiment Infantry of the Line.

2 Lieutenants, 2 Staff, 3 serjeants, 1 drummer, 77 rank and file.

French Artillery. 1 serjeant, 15 rank and file.

Total.—2 Lieutenants, 2 Staff, 4 serjeants, 1 drummer, 92 rank and file.

Thirteen of the above rank and file were wounded, and two since dead.

(Signed) C. KNONENFELDS, Major of Brigade:

[Here follows a Return of the cannon and ammunition taken in the Castle, which consisted chiefly of 12 mounted brass cannon, 6 dismounted iron guns, 2,200 lbs. of gunpowder, and 92,000 rounds of ball-cartridge.]

#### LONDON GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY.

*Downing-street, July 19.*—Dispatches, of which the following are extracts, have been this day received at Earl Bathurst's office, addressed to his Lordship by Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington.

*Ostiz, July 3, 1813.*—General Clausel having retired towards Logrono, after finding our troops at Vittoria on the 22d of June, and having ascertained the result of the action of the 21st, still remained in the neighbourhood of Logrono on the 24th, and till late on the 25th, and had not marched for Tudela, as I had been informed, when I wrote my dispatch of the 24th ultimo; I conceived, therefore, that there was some prospect of intercepting his retreat; and after sending the light troops

towards Roncevalles, in pursuit of the army under Joseph Buonaparté, I moved the light, 4th, 3d, and 7th divisions, and Colonel Grant's and Major-General Ponsonby's brigades of cavalry, towards Tudela, and the 5th and 6th divisions, and the household and General D'Urban's cavalry, from Vittoria and Salvatierra, towards Logrono, in hopes that I should be able to intercept General Clausel.—He, however, made some extraordinary forced marches, followed by General Mina with his own cavalry and the regiment of Spanish cavalry under the command of Don Julian Sanchez, and arrived at Tudela on the evening of the 27th. He there crossed the Ebro, but the Alcalde having informed him that we were upon the road, he immediately recrossed, and marched towards Saragossa, where, I understand from General Mina, he has since arrived.—General Mina is still following the enemy, and he has taken from him two pieces of cannon and some stores in Tudela, and three hundred prisoners. Lieut.-Gen. Clinton has also taken possession of five guns, which the enemy left at Logrono.—In the meantime the troops under the command of Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill have kept the blockade of Pampeluna, and have moved through the mountains to the head of the Bidassoa, the enemy having entirely retired into France on that side.—I enclose the report which I have received from Lieutenant-General Sir T. Graham, of his actions with the enemy on the 24th and 25th of June, which appear to have been more serious than I had imagined, when I addressed your Lordship on the 26th ult.—General Foy had with him the garrison of Bilbao and those of Mondragon and Tolosa, besides his division of the Army of Portugal, and his force was considerable. It gives me great satisfaction to see that the Spanish and Portuguese troops mentioned by Sir T. Graham, have conducted themselves so well.—The Lieutenant-General has continued to push on the enemy by the high road, and has dislodged them from all the strong positions which they had taken; and yesterday a brigade of the army of Galicia, under the command of General Castanos, attacked and drove the enemy across the Bidassoa, by the bridge of Irun. The enemy still maintained a post in a strong stone blockhouse, which served as a head to the bridge, and some troops in some loopholed houses on the right of the Bidassoa; but General Giron having sent for some Spanish artillery, and Captain

Dubourdieu's brigade of nine-pounders, having been sent to their support, the fire of these guns obliged the enemy to evacuate, and they blew up the blockhouse, and burnt the bridge.—Sir Thomas Graham reports, that in all these affairs the Spanish troops have conducted themselves remarkably well.—The garrison of Passages, consisting of one hundred and fifty men, surrendered on the 30th, to the troops under Colonel Longa.—The enemy, on seeing some of our ships off Deba, evacuated the town and fort of Guetaria on the 1st instant; and the garrison went, by sea, to St. Sebastian. This place is blockaded by land by a detachment of Spanish troops.—They have likewise evacuated Castro, and the garrison have gone by sea to Santona.—In my former reports, I have made your Lordship acquainted with the progress of the army of reserve of Andalusia, under Gen. the Conde del Abisbal, to join the army, and he arrived at Burgos on the 25th and 26th inst.—When the enemy retired across the Ebro, previous to the battle of Vittoria, they left a garrison of about seven hundred men in the castle of Pancorbo, by which they commanded and rendered it impossible for us to use the great communication from Vittoria to Burgos; I therefore requested the Conde del Abisbal, on his march to Miranda, to make himself master of the town and lower works, and to blockade the place as closely as he could. I have not received the report of his first operations; but, I understand, he carried the town and lower fort by assault on the 28th; and I have now the pleasure to enclose his report of the final success of this operation, and the copy of the capitulation, by which the garrison have surrendered.—The decision and dispatch with which this place has been subdued, are highly creditable to the Conde del Abisbal, and the officers and troops under his command.—I am concerned to inform your Lordship, that Lieutenant-General Sir J. Murray raised the siege of Tarago, I cannot say on what day, and embarked his troops. A great proportion of the artillery and stores were left in the batteries. It appears that Marshal Suchet, with a considerable body of troops, had moved from Valencia by Tortosa, and General Maurice Mathieu, with another corps, from the neighbourhood of Barcelona, for the purpose of impeding Sir J. Murray's operations, which he did not think himself sufficiently strong to continue.—I have not yet received from Sir J. Murray the detailed

account  
Lord  
joined  
army  
had  
arrive  
ceed  
tions.  
into  
advan  
ters a  
on th  
24th.

My  
when  
Puert  
weath  
bad,  
could  
it was  
move  
Major  
drago  
Germ  
brigad  
yet co  
colum  
road  
he oc  
very s  
road,  
villag  
a half  
Bradf  
and w  
the rig  
advan  
enemy  
strong  
As the  
left, i  
Chaus  
battali  
and fl  
Gener  
this se  
gallan  
drove  
sayn.  
posted  
on eac  
tom of  
time  
during  
withou  
guese  
valley  
rido,



account of these transactions: Lieut.-Gen. Lord Wm. Bentinck, however, who had joined and had taken the command of the army at the Coll de Balaguer, on the 17th, had brought it back to Alicant, where he arrived himself on the 23d, and was proceeding to carry into execution my instructions.—When Marshal Suchet marched into Catalonia, the Duque del Parque had advanced, and established his head-quarters at San Felipe de Xativa, and his troops on the Xucar, where he still was on the 24th.

*Tolosa, June 26, 1813.*

My Lord,—It was so late on the 23d when I received the order to march by the Puerto St. Adrian on Villa Franca, and the weather and the road were so extremely bad, that but a small part of the column could get over the mountain that day; and it was not till late on the 24th that I could move from Segura on Villa Franca, with Major-General Anson's brigade of light dragoons, the light battalions of the King's German legion, and the two Portuguese brigades; the rest of the troops not being yet come up.—The rear of the enemy's column was then just passing on the great road from Villa Real to Villa Franca, and he occupied, in considerable force, some very strong ground on the right of the great road, and of the river Orío, in front of the village of Olaverria, and about a mile and a half from Villa Franca.—Major-Gen. Bradford's brigade marched by Olaverria, and was employed to dislodge the enemy on the right, while the remainder of the troops advanced by the Chaussée, defended by the enemy's tirailleurs on the heights, and a strong body at the village of Veasayn.—

As the enemy reinforced the troops on his left, it became necessary to push on by the Chaussée, which was done by the light battalion, under Colonel Halkett, assisted and flanked by some companies of Major-General Pack's Portuguese brigade, and this service was performed, in the most gallant style, by these brave troops, who drove the enemy from the village of Veasayn.—The enemy having troops ready, posted on the succession of strong heights on each side of the deep valley, at the bottom of which the road runs, a considerable time became necessary to turn his flanks, during which he evacuated Villa Franca, without further dispute.—The Portuguese brigades on the right and left of the valley, pushed on their advance to Yehasurido, and the troops assembled at Villa

Franca. Here, likewise, the head of Gen. Giron's corps, and all Colonel Longa's, arrived in the course of the evening.—The next morning (the 25th) the enemy evacuated Celequia; and, as he had taken up a very strong position between that and Tolosa, covering the Pampeluna road, the Spanish corps of Colonel Longa was marched by Alzo towards Lizarga, to turn his left, while Lieutenant-General Mendizabel was requested to dispatch some battalions from Aspeytia to turn his right, appuyed on a high mountain, with an inaccessible ravine in front.—The enemy was driven from the summit of an important hill, lying between the Pampeluna and Vittoria roads, by a very skilful attack of Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, with two companies of the grenadiers of the 1st regiment, and three of the 4th cacadores, belonging to General Pack's brigade.—The conduct of Lieutenant Queires, and of Ensign Vasconcelles, of the 4th cacadores, was distinguished on this occasion. The latter officer lost an eye by a musket shot.—This hill was immediately occupied by Major-General Bradford's brigade, supported by the three line battalions of the King's German legion.—The rest of the day was chiefly spent in skirmishing with the enemy's tirailleurs, to give time for the Spanish corps arriving at their destination.—A general attack began between six and seven in the evening. Two guns of Capt. Ramsay's troop, and two nine-pounders of Captain Dubourdieu's, under an escort of Captain Childer's troop of the 16th light dragoons, and of the advance of Colonel Halkett's light battalions, were brought rapidly forward on the Chaussée, and fired with effect against several formed bodies of the enemy in the plain near the town; while the column, consisting of the German light battalions, the brigade of Guards, and the Spanish division of General Giron's, continued to advance by the Chaussée.—Two Spanish battalions, and one Portuguese, forming a separate column on the left of the Chaussée, passed quickly on the left on the town.—General Bradford and the line battalions of the Germans driving in the enemy on their front, by the Pampeluna road, and Colonel Longa from the side of the mountains still more on the right, turning and forcing, from very strong positions, all the posted bodies of the enemy on the right of the town.—Still the enemy held possession of the town, which was much more capable of defence than had been represented.—The Vittoria gate



was barricadoed, and also the Pampeluna gate on the bridge; and both were flanked by convents and other large buildings occupied by the enemy, and the town was nowhere open. A nine-pounder was therefore brought up under cover of the fire of the light battalion, close to the gate, which was thus burst open.—It was now dark, and it was not possible to distinguish the troops of the different nations engaged, which gave the enemy, now flying from every point, an opportunity of escaping with much less loss than he must have suffered had we had daylight.—The conduct of all the troops concerned in this attack was highly creditable; that of the line battalions on the Pampeluna road, and of the light battalions at the Vittoria gate, was such as was to be expected from these distinguished corps, and the column of the left did equal honour to the Spanish and Portuguese arms.—Col. Longa's corps, after a repetition of long and severe marches, undertook and executed, with the greatest spirit, the fatiguing duty of this day, and behaved in the most gallant manner. The battalions sent from Arpeyton by Lieut.-General Mendizabel, repulsed, with great steadiness, an attack of the enemy, and afterwards pursued him down from the mountains, taking a good many prisoners.—I have not yet got the return, but I believe above two hundred prisoners were taken by the two Spanish corps, and many wounded men were left here. The enemy's loss in killed, too, must have been considerable.—This place has, besides the defences at the gates, new towers to flank the exterior wall, and a strong wood block-house in the square, which shews the importance the enemy attached to its occupation.—It would be unjust to the troops employed in this assault, not to mention their exemplary conduct when in possession; there was no excess committed. The German Legion and Col. Longa's corps passed on, and formed immediately beyond the town.—I have the honour to enclose a return of the killed and wounded of the British and Portuguese in these two days, which, considering the nature of the service, could not have been expected to be less than considerable.—The Spaniards lost several officers killed and wounded yesterday, but I have not had any return of them.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) T. GRAHAM, Lieut.-Gen.  
The Marquis of Wellington, &c. &c. &c.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Allied Army under the Command of his Excellency Ge-*

*neral the Marquis of Wellington, K. G. in Action with the Enemy on the 24th and 25th of June, 1813.*

24th June, 1813.

1st Light Batt. King's German Legion. 5 rank and file killed; 2 Lieutenants, 2 serjeants, 30 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—2d Ditto. 2 rank and file killed; 1 Major, 1 Lieutenant, 2 drummers, 12 rank and file, wounded.

Portuguese Loss—1 serjeant, 11 rank and file, killed; 1 Captain, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 21 rank and file, wounded.

25th June, 1813.

1st Line Batt. King's German Legion. 1 rank and file killed; 1 Lieutenant, 6 rank and file, wounded.—2d Ditto. 5 rank and file killed; 2 Captains, 1 Lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 23 rank and file, wounded.—5th Ditto. 3 rank and file killed; 1 Captain, 1 serjeant, 25 rank and file, wounded.—1st Light Batt. King's German Legion. 5 rank and file killed; 2 Captains, 3 Lieutenants, 2 drummers, 24 rank and file, wounded.

Portuguese Loss—1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 1 serjeant, 22 rank and file, killed; 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 2 Captains, 1 Lieutenant, 7 Ensigns, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 131 rank and file, wounded; 1 Ensign, 43 rank and file, missing.

*General Total Loss on the 24th and 25th of June.*

Total British—21 rank and file killed; 1 Major, 5 Captains, 8 Lieutenants, 4 serjeants, 120 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file missing.

Total Portuguese—1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 33 rank and file, killed; 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 3 Captains, 1 Lieutenant, 7 Ensigns, 2 drummers, 152 rank and file, wounded; 1 Ensign, 43 rank and file, missing.

Grand Total—1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 3 serjeants, 54 rank and file, killed; 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 1 Major, 8 Captains, 9 Lieutenants, 12 Ensigns, 6 drummers, 272 rank and file, wounded; 1 Ensign, 44 rank and file, missing.

(Signed) E. PAKENHAM, Adj.-Gen.

*Names of Officers, killed, wounded, and missing*  
24th June, 1813.

1st Light Batt. King's German Legion. Lieutenant Wahrendorff, slightly; Lieutenant Wrahe, severely.—2d Ditto. Major H. Priess, severely; Lieutenant Kessler, slightly.

25th June, 1813.

1st Line Batt. King's German Legion. Lieutenant Boyd, slightly.—2 Ditto. Captains Lahrer and Beuerman, and Lieutenant Holle, severely.—5th Ditto. Captain Bacmeister, severely.—1st Light Batt. King's German Legion. Captain Cropp, severely (since dead); Captain Wynecken, slightly; Lieutenant Fincke, severely; Lieutenant Heise, slightly; Lieutenant Heugel, severely (arm amputated).

*Portuguese Officers killed.*

25th June, 1813.

24th Reg. Line. Lieutenant Joao Baptista Reimao, Ensign Luis Jeronimo.

*Portuguese Officers wounded.*

24th June.

13th Reg. Line. Captain Benjamin Jones, severely.

25th June.

13th Reg. Line. Lieutenant-Colonel Don Joaquim de Camera, severely; Ensign Diego de Souza, slightly.—24th Reg. Line. Captain Antonio Xavier da Rocha, slightly; Lieutenant



Luis de Azeredo, severely; Ensign Jose Maria, severely; Ensign Joao Baptista, slightly; Ensigns Joaquim Herculano and Jose Manoel, slightly.—4th Cacadores. Ensigns Vasconelles and Tellies, severely.—5th Cacadores. Captain Don Francisco Da Sylva, severely.

*Portuguese Officer missing.*

13th Reg. Line. Ensign Jose Pais.

*Santa Marta de Cubo, July 1, 1813.*

Sir,—On the 29th of June last, I had the honour to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the General in Chief of the National Armies, that the Cacadores and grenadiers of the first brigade of the first division of this army had assaulted and taken the fort of Santa Marta de Pancorbo. I have now the satisfaction of acquainting you, that at eight o'clock this morning, the castle of Santa Engracia, or principal fort of Pancorbo, surrendered by capitulation. The garrison consisted of 650 men; they had provisions for several days, no very great quantity of water, and that not of a good quality. There were found in the castle 25 pieces of cannon, of a caliber from 16 to four pounds, many gun carriages, and a sufficient quantity of ammunition for a regular defence. The garrison surrendered under the enclosed articles of capitulation, and will march tomorrow morning for Burgos.—From the 28th, the day on which the fort of Santa Marta was taken, I had posted the sharpshooters in the vicinity of the walls of the fort, and, by blockading it most vigorously, I cut off all communication with the spring from which they provided themselves with water. The different detachments employed upon this service, performed their duty with a steadiness and valour deserving every praise; and the enemy could no longer procure their water without imminent risk. Taking advantage of this circumstance, I ordered several numerous detachments to establish themselves as near the wall as possible, and out of the range of the enemy's guns. A quantity of ladders, and other necessary implements were procured for attacking the castle, but being anxious to adopt every necessary step for economizing the lives of my men, I hinted a second time to the Governor to surrender, which he consented to accede to, under condition of being carried back to France with his garrison; but he yielded at last, upon my refusing to admit this condition, and threatening to take the place by storm. The successful result of this business is not a little owing to the intelligence and judgment which my Aid-de-Camp, Lieutenant-

Colonel Juze Maria Reyna, displayed during the course of his conferences with the Governor. The result of the Lieutenant-Colonel's negociation has proved of no little advantage to us.—During the space of twenty-four hours, a battery for six pieces had been constructed on the summit of the hill, by the indefatigable exertions of the sappers of the army (and several peasants), under the direction of the Commandant General of the engineers, Marshal de Campo Don Manuel Japino, and six pieces of cannon, which had been collected by the Colonel, Major-General of the artillery, Don Matias Ferraz, were got upon the hill with the greatest activity, under the direction of the Colonel, who was ably assisted by the Lieutenant-Colonel of Artillery, Don Joze Jarabia, and the Serjeant-Major, Don Bartolomo Gutierrez, and other subaltern officers. Eight hours after the battery was commenced, the guns began to open upon the enemy, and besides causing him considerable loss, impressed him with sufficient respect for us.—I cannot but call the attention of the General in Chief of the national armies to the valour and activity displayed upon this occasion by Brigadier-General Don Joze Latorre, commanding the 1st brigade of infantry; by the Chief of the Staff of the Army, Colonel Don Miguel Desmaysieres, who scarcely took one moment's rest during the siege, which lasted three days; and to the good conduct of the Officers of the Staff who were placed under his orders, and that of the Commander and Officers of the infantry and cavalry which composed the besieging corps.—I must also notice the meritorious conduct of my Aids-de-Camp Lieutenant-Colonels Don Jozé de Ruiz, Don Jozé Maria Reyna, Don Victor Vinader, and Lieutenant Don Benito Diaz, and of my Military Secretary Don Jozé Serfate and Salagar, who carried my orders, on repeated occasions, to the very walls of the enemy's fort, heedless of the latter's fire. The enemy kept up a brisk fire from his guns, &c. but the loss which he occasioned us has been very inconsiderable. The enemy's surrendering the place created great regret among the troops, who had consented to take it by assault, and they only console themselves with the hope of their being more places to conquer. I have put a small garrison into the fort of Pancorbo, and shall supply it immediately with provisions and water; but I shall not make any addition to the works, without knowing first the intentions of the General in

Chief relative to the demolition or preservation of this place.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) EL CONDE DE ABISBAL.

To Don Louis Wimpffen, &c. &c.

(A True Copy.)

(Signed) WIMPFEN.

[Then follow the Articles of Capitulation entered into between Lieut.-Col. de Reyna, on the part of our Allies, and Lieut. Don Alexander de Ceva, on that of the French, for the fort of Pancorbo, in which the garrison was made prisoners of war, and allowed the honours of war.]

*Extract of a Letter from the Marquis of Wellington, dated Ostiz, July 3, 1813.*

I have reported, in my dispatch of this day, that Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray, had raised the siege of Tarragona, and had embarked, leaving behind him a portion of his artillery. On this transaction, I do not feel myself sufficiently informed to be able to write more.—I enclose copies of the letters which I have received relating to Tarragona.

[A letter from Sir John Murray to the Marquis of Wellington, dated Camp before Tarragona, imparts only, that he had detached Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost's brigade to attack the Fort of St. Philippe, with the mention of its capture.]

*Fort San Philippe, Coll de Balaguer, June 7, 1813.*

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you, that in obedience to your orders, I proceeded on the 2d inst. with the brigade under my command, consisting of the 2d battalion 67th regiment, and Roll Dillon's regiment, to which was added a detachment of the Royal Artillery, with two field-pieces, under the command of Captain Arabin, and Roll's Rifle Company, to attack the Castle of San Philippe, in the Coll de Balaguer.—Captain Adam, of His Majesty's ship Invincible, joined off Salon, for the purpose of co-operating with the troops under my command.—We landed on the 3d instant, at eleven o'clock in the forenoon, about one mile to the eastward of the entrance to the Pass from Tarragona. I was then joined by the Spanish regiments

of Barcelona and Palma, under the command of Don Jose Carles.—I immediately directed Roll's Rifles, the Light Company of the 67th, and Roll's Light Company, under the command of Capt. Muller, of Rolls', to invest the Fort as closely as possible, which he did so completely by two o'clock, that the enemy could not show himself before his parapet.

—One six-pounder was brought up the Sierra del Tasal, a very steep mountain, within seven hundred yards of the Fort to annoy the enemy with Shrapnell shells.

—The Engineer Officers not having arrived with the intrenching tools till very late, nothing further could be undertaken that evening.—The Fort of San Philippe is situated upon the eastern extremity of an insulated village, in the centre of the Coll de Balaguer, commanding completely the great road through the pass. It is a square Fort, with some bastions, but commanded on two sides by almost inaccessible mountains.—On the 4th, two 12-pounders and one howitzer, under the command of Lieut. Corbyn, of His Majesty's ship Invincible, and manned by the crew of that ship, were likewise brought up to the Tasal. This battery continued to play upon the Fort the whole day, in order to attract the attention of the enemy, whilst Captain Chyne, of the Royal Engineers, was tracing out the ground for the breaching batteries, within three hundred yards of the place, and the troops busied in filling the sand-bags. At night, the whole of the seamen and troops were employed, the former in bringing up five 24-pounders, shot, powder, &c. for the battery, whilst the troops constructed the work. The ground being very unfavourable, the whole could not be completed before break of day.—The embrasures were therefore filled up, and the work deferred till the following evening, when Captain Adam and myself sent a summons to the Commanding Officer, offering the most favourable terms; but they were rejected. On the 5th the batteries continued a heavy fire upon the fort. In the evening the working parties and seamen went down early to the battery.—The enemy having perceived the firing down, kept a heavy and galling fire of shells, round and grape shot, during

(To be continued.)

Published by R. BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent-Garden.

LONDON: Printed by J. M'Creery, Black-Horse-Court, Fleet-street.